If in fact he has not the right to live by the fruits of his labour, still less can he claim to live on the fruits of other people'slabour, in virtue of an assumed right to assistance. Undoubtedly we may assist him or employ him at a salary, but this is anact of benevolence, not a juridical solution of the question. If he cannot claim a share in the productive stock to live by hislabour on it, he has no right at all. It is no violation of justice to allow him to die of hunger. Need we say that this solution,which seems to be that of the official school of jurists and economists, is contrary alike to the innate sentiment of justice, tonatural right, to the primitive legislation of all nations, and even to the principles of those who adopt it?
In the Greek language, in which etymologies often disclose a complete philosophy, the words for just and justice ,1
as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the sum of the laws which human instinct follows in "the state of nature;" or,as in our day, the laws which are conformable to the nature of man, and which reason discloses. Natural law in both theseacceptations sanctions the right of property recognized in all.
We have in fact shewn, we believe, that all nations had in primitive times an organization which secured to every man ashare in the productive capital. Analysis also shews us that property is the indispensable condition of the existence, theliberty and the development of man. Innate sentiments of justice, primitive right and rational right, all agree therefore inimposing on every society the obligation of so organizing itself as to guarantee to every one the legitimate property whichshould belong to him.
"Natural rights," remarks M. Renonard, "are, as their name indicates, those which being indissolubly attached to the natureof human beings, spring from it, and live by it alone. They are the condition, not the concession, of positive laws, to whichthey are antecedent, and for which they form the basis." ( Du droit industriel , p. 173.)Rights are absolute, (7) insomuch as they conduce to perfect order; but their form is modified, because man, the subject ofrights, changes. The most perfect order, constituting the obligatory domain of justice, is not the same for savages andcivilized nations. A form of property, which in one place secures the greatest production and the most equitable distribution,may have very different results elsewhere; and in this case it is no longer right. What is the best form of property at anygiven moment we can only learn from the study of man's nature, of his wants and sentiments and the ordinary consequencesof his acts. This highest order is "right," because it is the shortest and most direct road to perfection. All that in this ordershould belong to each member of the human race, is his individual right. The task for which every one is most apt, and inwhich he can be of most use to his neighbours and himself, ought to be assigned to him, and the instruments of labournecessary to this occupation, in the degree in which they exist, form his legitimate patrimony. So long as men knew of nomeans of subsistence but the chase, pasturage or agriculture, this patrimony was a share in the soil, a part of the allmend . Inthe middle ages in the towns, where industry was developed and organized, it was a place in the corporation with a share inthe ownership of all that belonged to this community. The equalizing movement, which agitates modern society soprofoundly, will probably end in obtaining new recognition of the natural right of property, and even a guarantee for itsexercise, by means of institutions in harmony with the existing necessities of industry and the prescriptions of sovereignjustice. Obviously there can be no attempt at securing to every one a share in the soil, but simply an instrument of labour ora sphere for its exercise.
There must be for human affairs an order which is the best. This order is by no means always the existing one; else whyshould we all desire change in the latter? But it is the order which ought to exist for the greatest happiness of the humanrace. God knows it, and desires its adoption. It is for man to discover and establish it, NOTE A..
The following is the letter of Mr Mill, mentioned in the Preface, in the original French in which it was written by him:--Avignon, le 17 novembre 1872.
Cher Monsieur, J'ai lu vos articles dans la Revue des Deux-Mondes , du 1er juillet, 1er aoüt et 1er septembre. Votre esquisse de l'histoire dela propriété territoriale, et votre description des différentes formes que cette institution a revêtues à différentes époques, etdont is plupart se conservent encore dans quelque endroit, me somblent trèspropres au but que vous avez en vue, et que jepoursuis aussi depuis longtemps, celui de faire voir que la propriété n'est pas chose fixe, mais une institution multiforme, quia subi de grandes modifications et qui est susceptible d'en subir do nouvelles avec grand avantage. Vos trois articlesappellent et font désirer un quatrième, qui traiterait do l'application pratique do cette leçon à la société actuelle. C'est cequ'on trouvera sans doute dans votre livre.
