pt.ii; and Esquisse d'une Classification systématique des Doctrines Mind, chapter xi Philosophiques, part vi.J.EI.Newman: The Grammar of assent.J.Venn: Some Characteristics of Belief.V.Brochard: De l'Erreur, part ii chap.vi, ix; and Revue Philosophique, xxvii.1.E· Habier:
Psychologie, chap xxi, Appendix.Ollé Laprune: La Certitude Morale (1881).Cf.F.Stout: On Genesis of Cognition of Physical Reality, in 'Mind,'
Jan.J Pikler: The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence(London, 1890).-- Mill says that we believe present sensations; and makes our belief in all other things a matter of association with these.So far so good; but as he makes no mention of emotional or volitional reaction, Bain rightly charges him with treating belief as a purely intellectual state.
For Bain belief is rather an incident of our active life.When a thing is such, to make us act on it, then we believe it, according to Bain."But how about past things, or remote things, upon which no reaction of ours is possible? And how about belief in things which check action"
says Sully; who considers that we believe s thing only when " the idea of it has an inherent tendency to approximate in character and intensity to a sensation." It is obvious that each of these authors emphasizes a true aspect of the question.My own account has sought to be more complete, sensation, association, and active reaction all being acknowledged to be concerned.The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that out belief and attention are the same fact.For the moment, what we attend to is reality; Attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations force attention from us.On Belief and Conduct see an article by Leslie Stephen, Fortnightly Review, July 1888.
A set of facts have been recently brought to my attention which I hardly know how to treat, so I say a word about them in this footnote.Refer to a type of experience which has frequently found a place among the 'Yes'
answers to the 'Census of Hallucinations,' and which is generally described by those who report it as an 'impression of the presence' of someone near them, although no sense lion either of sight, hearing, or touch is involved From the way in which this experience is spoken of by those who have had it, it would appear to be an extremely definite and positive state of mind, coupled with a belief in the reality of its object quite as strong as any direct sensation ever gives.And yet no sensation seems to be connected with it at all.Sometimes the person whose nearness is thus impressed is a known person, dead or living, sometimes an unknown one.His attitude and situation are often very definitely impressed, and so, sometimes (though not by way of hearing), are words which he wishes to say.
The phenomenon would seem to be due to a pure conception becoming saturated with the sort of stinging urgency which ordinarily only sensations bring.But I cannot yet persuade myself that the urgency in Question consists in concomitant emotional and motor impulses.The ' impression' may come quite suddenly and depart quickly; it may carry no emotional suggestions, and wake no motor consequences beyond those involved in attending to it.
Altogether, the matter is somewhat paradoxical, and no conclusion can be come to until more definite data are obtained.
Perhaps the most curious case of the sort which I have received is the following.The subject of the observation, Mr.P., is an exceptionally intelligent witness, though the words of the narrative are his wife's.
