It is for that,if any,and for that alone to furnish a decision which neither party shall dare in theory to disavow.It is something to reconcile men even in theory.They are at least,something nearer to an effectual union,than when at variance as well in respect of theory as of practice.
21.In speaking of the supposed contract between King and people,(87)I have already had occasion to give the description,and,as it appears to me,the only general description that can be given,of that juncture at which,and not before,resistance to government becomes commendable;or,in other words,reconcileable to just notions;whether of legal or not,at least of moral,and,if there be any difference,religious duty.(88)What was there said was spoken,at the time,with reference to that particular branch of government which was then in question;the branch that in this country is administered by the King.But if it was just,as applied to that branch of government,and in this country,it could only be for the same reason that it is so when applied to the whole of government,and that in any country whatsoever.It is then,we may say,and not till then,allowable to,if not incumbent on,every man,as well on the score of duty as of interest,to enter into measures of resistance;when,according to the best calculation he is able to make,the probable mischiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the community in general)appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of submission.This then is to him,that is to each man in particular,the juncture for resistance.
22.A natural question here isby what sign shall this juncture be known?
By what common signal alike conspicuous and perceptible to all?A question which is readily enough started,but to which,I hope,it will be almost as readily perceived that it is impossible to find an answer.Common sign for such a purpose,I,for my part,know of none:he must be more than a prophet,'I think,that can shew us one.For that which shall serve as a particular sign to each particular person,'I have already given onehis own internal persuasion of a balance of utility on the side of resistance.
23.Unless such a sign then,which I think impossible,can be shewn,the field,if one may say so,of the supreme governor's authority,though not infinite,must unavoidably,I think,unless where limited by express convention,(89)be allowed to be indefinite.
Nor can I see any narrower,or other bounds to it,under this constitution,or under any other yet freer constitution,if there be one,than under the most despotic.Before the juncture I have been describing were arrived,resistance,even in a country like this,would come too soon:were the juncture arrived already,the time for resistance would be come already,under such a government even as any one should call despotic.
24.In regard to a government that is free,and one that is despotic,wherein is it then that the difference consists?Is it that those persons in whose hands that power is lodged which is acknowledged to be supreme,have less power in the one than in the other,when it is from custom that they derive it?By no means.It is not that the power of one any more than of the other has any certain bounds to it.The distinction turns upon circumstances of a very different com plexion:on the manner in which that whole mass of power,which,taken together,is supreme,is,in a free state,distributed among the several ranks of persons that are sharers in it:on the source from whence their titles to it are successively derived:on the frequent and easy changes of condition between governors and governed;whereby the interests of the one class are more or less indistinguish ably blended with those of the other:on the responsibility of the governors;or the right which a subject has of having the reasons publicly assigned and canvassed of every act of power that is exerted over him:on the liberty of the press;or the security with which every man,be he of the one class or the other,may make known his complaints and remonstrances to the whole community:on the liberty of public association;or the security with which malecontents may communicate their sentiments,concert their plans,and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt,before the executive power can be legally justified in disturbing them.
25.True then,it may be,that,owing to this last circumstance m particular,in a state thus circumstanced,the road to a revolution,if a revolution be necessary,is to appearance shorter;certainly more smooth and easy.
More likelihood,certainly there is of its being such a revolution as shall be the work of a number;and in which,therefore,the interests of a number are likely to be consulted.Grant then,that by reason of these facilitating circumstances,the juncture itself may arrive sooner,and upon less provocation,under what is called a free government,than under what is called an absolute one:grant this;yet till it be arrived,resistance is as much too soon under one of them as under the other.
26.Let us avow then,in short,steadily but calmly,what our Author hazards with anxiety and agitation,that the authority of the supreme body cannot,unless where limited by express convention,be said to have any assignable,any certain bounds.That to say there is any act they cannot do,to speak of any thing of their's as being illegal,as being void;to speak of their exceeding their authority (whatever be the phrase)their power,their right ,is,however common,an abuse of language.
