All other names are but insignificant sounds;and those of two sorts.One,when they are new,and yet their meaning not explained by definition;whereof there have been abundance coined by Schoolmen and puzzled philosophers.
Another,when men make a name of two names,whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent;as this name,an incorporeal body,or,which is all one,an incorporeal substance,and a great number more.
For whensoever any affirmation is false,the two names of which it is composed,put together and made one,signify nothing at all.For example,if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round,the word round quadrangle signifies nothing,but is a mere sound.So likewise if it be false to say that virtue can be poured,or blown up and down,the words inpoured virtue,inblown virtue,are as absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle.And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names.Frenchman seldom hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole,but by the name of Verbe often;yet Verbe and Parole differ no more but that one is Latin,the other French.
When a man,upon the hearing of any speech,hath those thoughts which the words of that speech,and their connexion,were ordained and constituted to signify,then he is said to understand it:
understanding being nothing else but conception caused by speech.
And therefore if speech be peculiar to man,as for ought I know it is,then is understanding peculiar to him also.And therefore of absurd and false affirmations,in case they be universal,there can be no understanding;though many think they understand then,when they do but repeat the words softly,or con them in their mind.
What kinds of speeches signify the appetites,aversions,and passions of man's mind,and of their use and abuse,I shall speak when I have spoken of the passions.
The names of such things as affect us,that is,which please and displease us,because all men be not alike affected with the same thing,nor the same man at all times,are in the common discourses of men of inconstant signification.For seeing all names are imposed to signify our conceptions,and all our affections are but conceptions;when we conceive the same things differently,we can hardly avoid different naming of them.For though the nature of that we conceive be the same;yet the diversity of our reception of it,in respect of different constitutions of body and prejudices of opinion,gives everything a tincture of our different passions.And therefore in reasoning,a man must take heed of words;which,besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature,have a signification also of the nature,disposition,and interest of the speaker;such as are the names of virtues and vices:for one man calleth wisdom what another calleth fear;and one cruelty what another justice;one prodigality what another magnanimity;and one gravity what another stupidity,etc.And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination.No more can metaphors and tropes of speech:but these are less dangerous because they profess their inconstancy,which the other do not.
