REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES.Among informers, criminals who denounce their accomplices have been distinguished from others, and the offer of pardon or rewards to induce them thus to act, has been condemned as altogether improper.
It must be acknowledged, that so long as there is any other means of obtaining the conviction of a criminal without thus rewarding an accomplice, this method is bad; the impunity necessarily accompanying it is an evil.But if there be no other means, this method is good: since the impunity of a single criminal is less evil than the impunity of many.
In relation, however, to weighty and serious crimes, no such rewards can with propriety be appointed by a general law.A general law offering pardon and reward to the criminal who informed amongst his accomplices, would be an invitation to the commission of all sorts of crimes:
it would be as though the legislator had said, ``Among a multitude of criminals, the most wicked shall not only be unpunished but rewarded.'' A man shall lay plans for the commission of a crime---shall engage accomplices with the intention of betraying them: to the natural profits of the crime, such a law would add the reward bestowed upon him as an informer.It is what has often happened under English law.It is one of the fruits of the maxim which prohibits the examination of suspected persons respecting facts which may tend to criminate themselves.It is, however, criminals who can always furnish , and who of often can alone furnish , the light necessary for the guidance of justice.But the examination of suspected persons being forbidden as a means of obtaining intelligence, there remains only the method of reward.
But when the reward, instead of being bestowed in virtue of a general law, is left to the discretion of the judge, and offered only when necessary, this inconvenience does not exist.Advantageous crimes can no longer be committed with security.Recourse being had to this costly method only when all other methods fail, there will always be a longer or shorter interval, during which every criminal will feel himself exposed to the punishment denounced against his crimes.The employment of reward in this manner having become usual, will exercise upon the security of criminals the effect of a general law: it might even be prescribed by such a law.This method would then possess all the advantages of an unconditional law, without its inconveniences.
Beccaria has condemned, without exception, every reward offered to accomplices.As the foundation of his opinion, he produces only a confused sentiment of disapprobation attached to the words `` treason and faithlessness ''.
Voluntary conventions among men are generally useful to society.It would be in most cases productive of evil, were they not considered binding.Infamy has therefore become constantly attached to the terms treason and faithlessness.The acts, however to which these terms are applied, are only pernicious in as far as the contracts of which they are violations are at least innocent.To render the security of society (which crimes, were they to remain unpunished, would destroy)subordinate to the accomplishment of all manner of engagements, would be to render the end subordinate to the means.What would become of society, were it once established as a principle, that the commission of a crime became a duty if once it had been promised? That promises ought to be performed, is a maxim which, without a limitation excepting those the performance of which would be pernicious to society, might to have place neither in laws nor in morals.It is doubtful which would be most injurious---the non-performance of every promise, or the performance of all.Far from being a greater evil than that to which it is opposed, it would be difficult to show that the non-performance of criminal engagements is productive of any evil.From the performance of such an engagement, an unfavourable judgment only can be formed of the character of the party: how can a a similar judgment be formed from its violation? Because he has repented of having committed or been willing to commit an action injurious to society, and which he knew to be so, does it follow that he will fail to perform actions which he knows to be innocent and useful?
