It is interesting to observe the respective ways in which the Scottish and the German metaphysician sought to meet the great sceptic.It is evident that his assaults might be repelled at one or other of two places: either where the foe has entered, or after he has made certain advances.That the mind begins with impressions and goes on to ideas, which are mere reproductions of impressions,-this is the fundamental principle of Hume.Now this may be denied, I think should be denied.On what ground, we ask, does he allow the existence of impressions and ideas? When he answers, we can show him that on the same ground he must admit more; that he must allow that the mind has convictions in regard to its own existence, and the existence of external objects, and perceptions of moral goodness.But again, he may be met at the farther stages of his progress.
He asserts that the mind can reach no truth except such as it gets from experience.It may be shown in opposition that it has an original furniture in the shape of tendencies and laws which lead to and guarantee necessary and eternal truth.It is interesting to observe that Reid met him at both these points.Reid made a very careful inquiry into the nature of the senses as inlets of knowledge; and showed that accompanying the sensation there is always an intuitive perception of an external world.He showed too, though he did not make so much of it as he might, that consciousness is a mental faculty and a source of knowledge.He farther met the sceptic at the more advanced point, and proved that the mind has a primitive reason or common-sense which decides at once that things are so and so; that every effect, for instance, must have a cause.I am not of opinion that Reid has thoroughly cleared up these subjects, that he has detected all that is in the senses, that he has unfolded fully the laws of intuition and its mode of operation; but he has established enough to repel the assaults of the sceptic.
Reid possessed many of the best qualities of his countrymen; in particular, he was shrewd and independent:
but he was not {160} endowed with great powers of logical analysis.On the other hand, Kant was strong where Reid was weak; that is, in power of dissection and construction: but was deficient where Reid excelled, in patient observation.
He neglected, as I think most unfortunately, to oppose the fundamental principle of Hume.He allows that the mind begins with <phenomena> in the sense of appearances, and these phenomena are just the <impressions> of Hume.But if it be allowed that in the original inlet we have only impressions or phenomena, it never can be satisfactorily shown how we can reach reality by any composition or decomposition of these.Kant exercised his vast powers in meeting Hume at the other point; that is, in showing that there is an priori furniture in the mind, independent of all experience.But what he built with the one hand he took down with the other.For these <a priori> forms could not, in his theory, guarantee any objective reality.He accepts the conclusion of Hume, and allows that the speculative reason could not guide to truth; he goes so far as to maintain that it lands us in contradictions.This philosophy, intended to overthrow the scepticism of Hume, has thus led to a scepticism which has had a more extensive sway than that of the cold Scotchman ever had.He endeavored to save himself from such an issue by calling in a practical reason, which guaranteed as its corollaries the ******* and immortality of the soul, and the Divine existence.But it was immediately asked how it could be shown that the practical reason does not deceive, after it has been conceded that the speculative reason leads to illusion? Thus the insecure mound, raised with such labor to stem the flood, only aggravated the outburst and overflow as it gave way.
Sir W.Hamilton sought to unite Reid and Kant, but was never able to weld thoroughly together the principles which he took from two such different sources.His doctrines of the relativity of knowledge, and of causation as a mere impotency of the mind, have prepared the way for a doctrine of nescience now largely espoused.Some of his pupils have betaken themselves to a sort of confused Berkeleyani** mingled with Kanti**, which will furnish an easy passage to the nescient theory in so shrewd a nation as Scotland, and among so practical a people as the English.Mr.Mill, in his examination {161} of Hamilton's Philosophy, has brought us to a <Humism> joined to Comtism.This is the dismal creed provided for those who choose to follow the negative criticisms.of the day in philosophy and theology.What we need in these circumstances is a new Thomas Reid, not to do over again the work which the common-sense philosopher did, but a corresponding service in this age to what he did in his time.
